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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.
This is a declaratory judgment case which was bifurcated from the damages/accounting
action filed by Bret Kunz (and later Marti Kunz), insurance agents operating the Montpelier office
of an insurance agency business. The action was instituted against Nield, Inc. (Pocatello office) d/b/a
Insurance Designers under a contract between the two offices. Bret and his wife took over the
Montpelier Office after Bret's brother, Michael 0. Kunz, suddenly died in July 2008.
Michael Kunz had a contract relationship with Nield, Inc., under which both Michael and
Nield, Inc. were 50/50 co-owners of the Montpelier "Book of Business" (i.e. the right to
commissions from residuals and other premiums paid on existing policies). Bret bought out Mike's
widow, Judy Kunz', 50 percent and took over operations of the Montpelier office, having his wife,
Marti Kunz, obtain her insurance licence for the life and health business (which was wholly owned
by Michael Kunz). Bret continued the property and casualty insurance as he had been an agent in the
Montpelier office for many years. Nield, Inc. suggested Bret buy Mike's book of business.
Bret then requested that Nield, Inc. (then managed by Bryan Nield) prepare a contract for
Bret and Marti to be identical with what Michael had previously with Nield, Inc. Bryan Nield
prepared a draft which was approved by both Bret and Marti. Subsequently they had a formal, in
person, signing around the end of October or early November 2008. However, the document actually
signed contained language different than the draft, and different than the Michael Kunz contract.
That contract is the subject of the underlying action and this appeal.
From 2009 through 2013, when this case was filed, Bret Kunz received profit sharing,
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sometimes called contingent commission, payments originating from the sales of insurance through
State Insurance Co. (hereinafter "Gem

Acuity Insurance Co. (hereinafter "Acuity"),

Farmer's Alliance Insurance Co. (hereinafter "Alliance"). He

claimed entitlement to his pro-rata

share of Profit Sharing payments received by Nield, Inc., for those same years.
The original issues set for the first stage of the bifurcated trial were the right to receive the
profit sharing payments, the proper commission split bet'.veen Nield, Inc. and Bret Kunz on profit
sharing payments, and whether or not Nield, Inc. had any right to commissions of the life and health
policies sold by Plaintiffs. After a two-day trial on the declaratory judgment issues, the Court ruled
that Plaintiff Bret Kunz had no right to profit sharing or contingent commissions payments relative
to Acuity, Alliance or Allied, but did have a right to 50% of the profit sharing payments on Gem
State. Since Defendant stipulated on the eve of trial that it had no interest in the Kunz's life and
health business, and the Court certified the Declaratory Judgment issues as final for appeal, pursuant
to I.R.C.P. Rule 54, and this appeal ensued. This is the strange situation where the Plaintiffs
prevailed at trial, and the fact finder found their witnesses credible, found the Defendant's witnesses
not credible, found the facts in favor of the Plaintiff, but ruled for the Defendant anyway.

(ii) Course of Proceedings.
Plaintiff Bret Kunz filed a complaint on November 13, 2013, seeking an accounting of all
profit sharing, bonuses, surplus commissions, or other incentives paid to Nield, Inc. from 2008
through 2012, (Count One), and Declaratory Relief that (l) the agent contract in question includes
all bonuses, commissions, incentives, and profit sharing or other remuneration received by Nield,
Inc. that are influenced by Plaintiff' sales of insurance policies; (2) that the Plaintiff appropriate
share of said bonus or profit sharing is 80%; and (3) that Nield, Inc. had no interest in the health and
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life insurance sold by Plaintiff. (Count Two). R.
Defendant answered and counterclaimed, seeking damages for breach of contract for not
all insurance through Nield,

and simultaneously filed a "Cross-Claim Complaint"

against Marti Kunz for breach of contract, as well. 1 R. 42-52
Plaintiff sought to subpoena the records of three of the insurance companies ( other than Gem
State) for 2009-2012 which Defendant opposed by Motion for Protective Order. R. 58-74.
Defendant also filed a Motion for Change of Venue. R. 77-79. The Court denied both the
Motion for Protective Order and the Motion to Change Venue. R. 181-205.
Defendant also filed a Motion to Bifurcate the proceedings, R. 142-43, and the issue was
briefed by both parties. R. 144-50, 155-602, 171-77.
The Court granted the Motion to Bifurcate, R.208-11, but denied the included Motion to Stay
Discovery, and held that the first trial would be limited to the Plaintiffs Declaratory Relief count,
and that any damages, accounting, breach of contract claims would be held later. Said trial was set
for December 8 and 9, 2014 (after a stipulated continuance from the first setting date). R. 246-48.
On November 12, 2014 Defendant moved to amend its Answer and Complaint to add a
defense of statute of limitations and a claim for unjust enrichment. R. 267-83. After briefing and
hearing, this Motion to Amend was withdrawn and the Defendant agreed to dismiss the Cross-Claim
against Marti Kunz with prejudice, to dismiss the Counterclaim against Bret Kunz without prejudice.

The premise was alleged failure to pay life and health premiums sold by Marti Kunz; she
was never licensed for property and casualty insurance. Although designated "Cross-claim
Complaint" it was in fact a Third Party Complaint.
1

record does not contain pages 2-4 of Plaintiffs' brief in opposition, but the courtesy
copy was received by the judge.
2The
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Marti Kunz was added as a party Plaintiff with respect to her community interest in the subject
contract. It was further stipulated that

Plaintiffs claim for declaratory relief
11/20/14 hearing, p.

LL. 17-25)
Trial was held on December 8 and 9, 2014 and a trial transcript was requested, after which
both parties submitted their proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. 427-438; 447477. Plaintiff also filed its Closing Argument Brief. R. 439-446.
The Court, Honorable Mitchell Brown presiding, entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Memorandum Decision on August 31, 2015. R. 497-529. In conclusion to that ruling,
the second ,is states, "The Court recognizes that this is an interlocutory order, but that it likely is
dispositive of Bret Kunz' claims for Breach of Contract; therefore, the Court will certify this matter
for appeal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b) should that be the desire of the parties." R. 526, second ,is.
A "Declaratory Judgment" was entered on September 18, 2015. R. 565-67. On October 30,
2015 Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal. R. 678-81. A "Declaratory Judgment and Rule 54(b)
Certificate" was entered on November 5, 2015, R. 687-90, and an Amended Notice of Appeal filed
on November 12, 2015 R. 722-25. A "Judgment and Rule 54 Certificate" was filed on December 22,
2015, R. 746-48 and R. 760-61. 3 A Second Amended Notice of Appeal was filed by the Plaintiffs
on December 28, 2015. Defendant filed a Motion to Amend Or Alter the Judgment on January 5,
2016, R. 765-79, which was denied on January 30, 2016. R. 788-89.
(iii) Statement of Facts.

"Judgment" was in response to the conditional notice to dismiss appeal, R. 744-745,
but then omits Bret Kunz' prevailing on his 3rd Claim of Declaratory Relief, i.e. that Defendant
has no interest in his life and health business.
3This

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - Page 4

Generally speaking, Appellants do not take much umbrage with the lower Court's Findings
except as hereafter argued. Since the Court had the benefit of a transcript,

findings are

COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT
To the extent that any of the Court's Findings of Fact are deemed to be Conclusions of Law,
they are incorporated in the Court's Conclusions of Law.
1.

"B.Kunz [Bret Kunz] and M.Kunz [Marti Kunz] are husband and wife and resided in Bear
Lake County, Idaho at all times germane to this proceeding.

2.

B.Kunz and M.Kunz own and operate an insurance business in Montpelier, Idaho doing
business as Insurance Designers. B.Kunz and M.Kunz are both licensed insurance agents in
the state of Idaho.

3.

N.I. [Nield, Inc.] is an Idaho corporation authorized to transact insurance business in the state
of Idaho. N.I. 's principal place of business is in Pocatello, Idaho. N.I. also does business
under the name Insurance Designers. N.I. is owned by two (2) brothers, Bryan Nield
(B.Nield) and Benjamin Nield (Ben Nield). They purchased this corporation from their father
Thomas Nield (T.Nield) in approximately 2009. Tr. p. 194. LL. 9-21.

4.

B.Kunz has been in the insurance business since approximately 1996 when began working
for his brother, Michael 0. Kunz (M.0.Kunz). (Tr. Vol. I, p. 22 L.20 top. 23 L.I)

5.

In 1982, M.O.Kunz and N.I. entered into an "Agent Contract". The "Agent Contract"
between M. 0 .Kunz and N .I. was to continue indefinitely "or as long as authorized by [N.I.' s]
Board of Directors." Trial Exhibit (Tr. Ex.) 101, ,rIII. The "Agent Contract" between
M.O.Kunz and N.I. outlined the duties and responsibilities ofM.O.Kunz under the "Agent
Contract". Included among these responsibilities was the responsibility "to place insurance
business through [N.I.] except for health and life policies that are individual company
appointments." Id. at ,r V. The "Agent Contract" also outlined the responsibilities ofN.I.
These responsibilities included, in part, maintaining contracts with insurance companies for
placing insurance; and to provide the agent with an earned commission check based upon
agreed percentage by the 15th of each month. Id. at ,r VI. The agreed upon commission
between M. O.Kunz and N.I. was that "80% percent of the commission received on insurance
placed" through N.I. would be paid to M.O.Kunz with N.I. receiving "20% percent of
commission placed through" N.I. Finally, the "Agent Contract" also contained a provision

Additional references are added in parenthesis and italics. The District Court's findings
and references to the transcript are cited verbatim otherwise.
4
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with respect to ownership ofM.O.Kunz'
of business which provided that N.I. "Owns
u:,u1i.;;:,.- placed by [M.O.Kunz] through [N.I.] and M.0.Kunz owns 50%. Id.

,rYII.s
M.O.Kunz passed
on
to M.0.Kunz' death, B.Kunz operated as a
sub-producer directly beneath M.O.Kunz. B.Kunz testified that the business arrange~ent that
existed between him and M.O.Kunz, his older brother, was that he, B.Kunz, received the
entire 80% commission to which M.O.Kunz was entitled under his "Agent Contract" with
NJ. M.0.Kunz was providing B.Kunz with the office, computers an~ office ove~head.
B.Kunz testified that other than M.0.Kunz receiving "any profit shanng or contingent
commission" resulting from the sales attributable to B.Kunz, M.0.Kunz did not make "a
dime off on" B.Kunz. Tr.,p. 27, LL. 27. 6 In fact, because ofB.Kunz' business relationship
with M.0.Kunz, N.I. and B.Kunz entered into an "Agent Contract" in 1996 as well. See Tr.
Ex. 162. 7 This "Agent Contract" mirrored the agreement that B.Kunz had with M.O.Kunz
and paid B.Kunz "80% of commission received on insurance placed with" N.I. receiving
20%. See Tr. Ex. 102.

7.

B.Kunz testified that he never received any profit sharing or contingent commission while
operating as a sub-producer for M.O.Kunz. Tr., p. 27, LL. 18-19. He testified further that he
did not expect to receive or share in any profit sharing or contingent bonuses. Tr. P. 90, LL.
21-23. The reason why B .Kunz did not expect to share in the bonuses is outlined in his crossexamination testimony when he was asked to read from his prior deposition testimony. In
doing so, his deposition testimony relates that the reason he did not receive bonuses under

The "Agent Contract" contains two (2) paragraphs numbered seven (7). The Ownership
provisions are contained in the second of the two (2) paragraphs numbered seven (7).
5

As outlined above, a certified copy of the transcript of these trial proceedings was
prepared by the Court's Court Reporter, Rodney M. Felshaw. The Trial transcript consists of two
(2) volumes: the first volume includes the testimony for the first day oftrial and consists of pages
I through 262; the second volume includes the testimony for the second day of trial and consists
of pages 263 through 427. The Court will cite to this transcript in these F.F.C.L. & M.D.O. as
"Tr." followed by the relevant page and line numbers.
6

Although Tr. Ex. 102 purports to be signed on January l, 1982, the Court finds this to be
a scrivener's error. B.Kunz' testimony is clear that he did not begin working in the insurance
industry until 1996. See Tr. p., 23, LL. 24-25 and p. 24, L. 1. He also testified that this date was
in error. See Tr., p. 132, LL. 24-25, p. 133, LL. 1-10. What appears to have happened is that N.I.
used its Agent Contract with M.O.Kunz as a template for its Agent Contract with B.Kunz and in
making the revisions, modifications and additions to the document in order to memorialize the
parties' agreement, N.I. did not modify the date of the Agent Contract. This is supported not only
by B.Kunz' testimony but by the fact that the date on M.0.Kunz' "Agent Contract" was January
1, 1982.
7
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the 1996 "Agent Contract" is because he "didn't own the book of business." Tr. P. 138, LL.

Following M.0.Kunz' death,
and M.Kunz purchased M.0.Kunz' share of the book
with NJ. and the insurance agency located
business or "business placed"
in Montpelier from M.0.Kunz' surviving spouse, Judy Kunz.
p.
LL.
and Tr. Ex.
128.
9.

Around the time that B.Kunz and M.Kunz purchased M.O.Kunz' book of business and the
insurance agency, B.Kunz and NJ. began to have discussions with NJ. concerning their
business relationship. B.Kunz testified that a "ne\v contract became necessary that would
include an ownership clause similar to the one contained in M.O.Kunz' "Agent Contract"
with N.1. B.Kunz' 1996 "Agent Contract" did not contain an ownership clause. Tr., p. 33,
LL. 4-8. B.Kunz testified that one of the advantages of being a sub-contractor or having an
"Agent Contract" with N.1. was to gain access to better contracts with certain insurance
companies. Tr., p. 98, LL. 22-25.

10.

B.Kunz testified that it was suggested by B.Nield that B.Nield and N.I. just sign the same
contract that it had with M.O.Kunz. Tr., p. 34, LL. 5-7. Later, B.Kunz testified that he and
M.Kunz wanted the same kind of contract that M.O.Kunz had with NJ. Tr., p. 132. LL. 1618.

11.

B.Kunz testified that in October of 2008, a draft of the prospective "Agent Contract" was
prepared and brought, by B.Nield, to his office, in Montpelier, for his and M.Kunz' review.
Tr., p. 33, LL. 13-25. B.Kunz testified that both he and M.Kunz closely reviewed the draft
of the prospective "Agent Contract." See Tr. Ex. 103. B.Kunz testified that this draft of the
prospective "Agent Contract" appeared, to him and M.Kunz, "to mirror the [Agent] Contract
with [M.O.Kunz]. Tr. p. 34, LL. 4-8.

12.

B.Kunz testified that upon being presented with a draft of the prospective "Agent Contract"
between B.Kunz and N.I., he was told that ifhe and M.Kunz "were okay with it, he [B.Nield]
would take it back and put it on [N.I.'s] letterhead." Tr. p. 33, LL. 21-25.

13.

B.Kunz testified that following this meeting in October of 2008, he expected that the final
document he was to be presented for signature would contain the terms of draft of the
prospective "Agent Contract" between B.Kunz and N.I. as reflected in Tr. Ex. 103.

14.

B.Nield testified that typically NJ. has its contracts on NJ. letterhead. He also stated that the
language in Tr. Ex. 103 is similar to that contained in its contracts, but because it is not on
N.I. letterhead, he "does not believe that [he] drafted it." Tr. p. 195, LL. 1-5. He also denied
that he came to Montpelier and delivered it to B.Kunz and M.Kunz. Tr.,p. 195, LL. 5-7.
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15.

B.Kunz testified that during the latter part of October, 2008, or the early part of November,
2008, T.Nield, B.Nield, and Ben Nield came to B.Kunz' office in Montpelier, Idaho.
B.Kunz' testimony continues that he was presented with the "Agent Contracts" for himself
and M.Kunz. B.Kunz explains that because had looked at draft [or the prospective "Agent
Contract" between B.Kunz and NJ. as reflected in Tr.
103] [he] did not look at that
contract very closely." Tr. p. 35, LL.
The "Agent Contract" for B.Kunz and M.Kunz
were signed on this occasion. See Tr. Ex. 104 (M.Kunz "Agent Contract") and Tr. Ex. 105
(B.Kunz "Agent Contract"). However, the "Agent Contract" reflects that the effective date
of the contract is January 2009.

16.

The "Agent Contract" between B.Kunz and NJ. was drafted by B.Nield. Tr. p. 195, LL. 1719.

17.

B.Kunz also testified that on this occasion, B.Nield "mentioned...that they had had some
pretty good profit sharing checks with [M.0.Kunz] 8 Tr. p. 35, LL. 15-16.

18.

The 2009 "Agent Contract" entered into between B.Kunz and N.I. contains the following
provisions that are pertinent to the dispute of the parties:
a.

Paragraph 5 outlines the responsibilities of the agent, B.Kunz. These responsibilities
include: (a) being identified as a subcontractor and having responsibility for all
expenses related to his business, (b) placing all insurance business through N.I. and
not through any other company, and ( c) responsibility for collection all premium and
return commissions on business placed. The responsibility outlined in ( c) is clarified
further by language stating that when collections are not on time, deductions may be
made from payment of commissions due. When the collection is completed the
deducted commission will be paid;

b.

Paragraph 6 outlines the responsibilities of N.I. These responsibilities include: (a)
maintain contracts with companies for placing insurance, (b) provide the accounting
and billing (except collections), ( c) provide B.Kunz with a 1099 Form showing
annual earnings, (d) provide B.Kunz with a commission earned statement and

"Contingent commission" and "profit sharing" are phrases that appear to be used
interchangeably in the insurance industry and certainly amongst the parties in this litigation.
B.Kunz defines these phrases in the following terms: "Profit sharing, sometimes called
'contingent commissions' is remuneration paid by the insurance company on generally an annual
basis and predicated on a variety of facts, including written premium, loss ratios, and new
business." Plaintifrs Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 5 ,i 23. Similarly,
N.I. defines these phrases in the following fashion: "A contingent commission of profit sharing is
a form of consumption that is different than monthly commission because the contingent
commission or profit sharing is conditioned upon an agent meeting certain guidelines."
Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 9 ,i 35.
8
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commission check based on agreed percentages on the 15 1h of each month,9 and (e)
other
based upon commission split and individual agreement. See Tr. Ex.

19.

c.

Paragraph 7 outlines the terms of compensation between B.Kunz and N .I. I~ provides
that B.Kunz will receive 80 percent of the commission received by NJ. on msurance
placed by B.Kunz with N.I., and NJ. will receive 20 percent of commissions placed
by B.Kunz with NJ.;

d.

Finally, paragraph 8 outlines the ownership interest between N.I. and B.Kunz,
providing that B.Kunz will own 50 percent of the book of business, and N .I. will own
50 percent of the book of business.

B.Kunz testified that after the "Agent Contract" was signed in late October, 2008 or early
November, 2008, he had another discussion with B.Kunz [sic] where the subject of profit
sharing came up. B.Kunz testified that this conversation took place between November of
2008 and February of 2009, sometime before he received his first profit sharing check. Tr.
p. 41, LL. 7-10. B.Kunz describes this conversation in the following manner:

Yes, There was another time when Marti and I were down in the
Pocatello office. I can't remember exactly what we were discussing,
but Bryan and I went into his office, that used to be Tom Nield's
office, to look something up. He was trying to motivate me and he
made the comment of how nice the profit sharing checks were.
Tr. p. 40, LL. 16-21.

20.

B.Kunz testified that the first year following his purchasing the agency and entering into the
2009 "Agent Contract" with N.I., he received profit sharing as it relates to Gem State
Insurance Company. Tr. p. 43, LL. 5-7. This Gem State Insurance profit sharing for 2008 is
documented in Tr. Ex. 115. 10 B.Kunz testified that this documentation represents profit

The 2009 Agent Contracts for B.Kunz and M.O.Kunz are substantively identical. Tr. p.
34, LL. 23-25, p. 35, L. 1. However, on each of these contracts, three (3) lines at the beginning of
the second page are illegible because the content of the contract is placed on the page in such a
manner that the Insurance Designer letterhead blocks out the language of the parties' agreement.
However, based upon the testimony of the parties and by utilizing Tr. Ex. 101, and 103, as well
as attempting to decipher the blocked content on Tr. Ex. 's I 04 and I 05, the Court concludes that
the blocked content reads as outline in sub-paragraph 2(d).
9

10By

way of a post script at the bottom of Tr. Ex. 115, it states that the profit sharing
check in the sum of $2,900.00 was sent to the Pocatello office, presumably the office ofN.I. The
Court notes that Tr. Ex 115 does not address how this $2,900.00 was split between B.Kunz and
N.I. However, B.Kunz testified that it was based upon a 50/50 percentage split. Tr. p. 44, LL. 16APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - Page 9

sharing earned in 2008, but paid out in

Tr. p. 43, LL. 5-7. 11

2

B.Kunz testified that
profit sharing from Gem State Insurance
Company in 2009 due to the number
within his book of business. ~ad B.Kunz
qualified, these would have been paid in
Tr.
LL.
B.Kunz testified furt?er
that he did not receive profit sharing or contingent commissions in 20 l 0, for profit sharmg
earned in 2009 from any other company. Tr. p.
L. 24.

22.

B.Kunz did qualify for profit sharing through Gem State Insurance Company again in 2010,
with payment being made in 2011. Tr. p. 43, L. 25, p. 44, LL. 1-3. Tr. Ex. 106 reflects a
Memo from B.Nield to B.Kunz, dated March 22, 2022, reflecting profit sharing for 2010 for
A
'
12
both Gem State Insurance Company an d 1·\.cmty.

23.

On April 10, 2012, B.Kunz received a Memo from B.Nield outlining profit sharing for
2011. 13 See Tr. Ex 107. This Memo reflected profit sharing from Gem State Insurance and

20. This is confirmed byB.Nield. Tr. P. 202, LL. 5-7.
It should be noted that the Gem State Insurance book of business is exclusively written
by B.Kunz out of his Montpelier office. N.I. does not write Gem State insurance. So the
commission earned from Gem State as well as any profit sharing or contingent bonus would have
resulted 100% from policies written out of B.Kunz' office in Montpelier, Idaho. Tr. p. 45, LL.
21-25, p. 46.
11

12 Again,

this Memo does not reflect the amount of the profit sharing or contingent
commission paid to N.I. or the percentage split between N.I. and B.Kunz. B.Kunz testified that
the Gem State Insurance Company profit sharing was paid on a 50/50 percentage and that he
does not know on what percentage the Acuity profit sharing was paid, but believes he was only
paid 22% of what he should have been paid. Tr. p. 44, LL. 10-13, p. 48, LL. 4-25, p. 49, LL. 1-2.
B.Kunz takes the position that he did not agree that he should be paid on a 50/50 percentage
basis and instead argues that he should be paid on an 80/20 percentage with him receiving 80%
and N.i. receiving 20%. Tr. p. 44, LL. 18-20. B.Kunz testified that this issue was raised in a
telephone conversation with B.Kunz where B.Nield took the position that profit sharing or
contingent commissions was to be based upon ownership percentages, not commission
percentages. Tr. p. 44, LL. 21-22. Later in his testimony, B.Kunz suggests that he was mistaken
in his earlier testimony and that this conversation occurred following payment of the first profit
sharing from Gem State Insurance Company in 2009 for profit sharing earned in 2008. See Tr. p
178, LL. 4-13.
13 The

Memo itself incorrectly reflects that this is for profit sharing for 2010. However, the
Court accepts B.Kunz' explanation that this is actually for profit sharing in 2011 and N.I. 's
stipulation to this fact. See Tr. p. 49, LL. 1
p. 50, LL. 1-5.
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Alliance. 14 B.Kunz testified that the profit sharing for Gem State Insurance reflected a 50/50
percentage split, but that the profit sharing
Alliance was less than 10 percent of the 80
LL 12-22.
percent split which he believes he should have received. Tr., p.
In 2003, the issue concerning the profit sharing or contingent commission issue became
objectively apparent. B.Kunz sent B.Nield a letter addressing this issue. This letter was dated
January 16, 2013 and addressed the Gem State Insurance profit sharing for 2012. See Tr. Ex.
108. In this letter B.Kunz enclosed the profit sharing check from Gem State Insurance in the
sum of $4,722.00 B.Kunz further advises that the profit sharing split should be "on the same
basis as the commissions, 80/20. B.Kunz noted that this issue, presumably the percentage
split, was never addressed in the contract with M.O.Kunz or himself. Id. B.Nield responded
to B.Kunz' letter, Tr. Ex. 108, byway of a document titled Memo date January 22, 2013. See
Tr. Ex. 109. B.Nield's Memo acknowledges that there is nothing in the "Agent Contract"
concerning the issue (again the Court concludes this is a reference to the percentage split).
He continues by including a paragraph concerning his position on profit sharing. This
paragraph provides as follows:
Let me share my thoughts. Profit sharing is a bonus based on loss
ratios and book of business as you know. It is not based on
commissions. The reason we have split profit sharing 50/50 is based
on ownership, not commissions, and there are not guarantees on
profit sharing.
Tr. Ex. 109. At the conclusion of this Memo, B.Nield relents and sends B.Kunz a
check for profit sharing, as relates to Gem State Insurance and its profit sharing for
2012, in the sum of $3,777.00. However, this appears to the Court to be a one-time
acquiescence and showing of good faith on the part ofB.Nield and N.l. 15 Based upon
the content of the letter, it is clear that N.L is not conceding that the profit sharing or
contingent bonus split should be an 80/20 percentage split, with B.Kunz receiving the
80 percent. 16
25.

In April 2013, the issue of profit sharing or contingent commission earned in 2012 continued

14

AI1iance is also referred to at times in the testimony and exhibits as Farmers Alliance.

15

The Court chooses to characterize this acquiescence in these terms. Certainly the parties
were in a business relationship and attempting to resolve this dispute. The Court recognizes that
now that the parties are in litigation, B.Nield chooses to characterize it in different terms
("because it's not worth the fight"). Tr., p. 209, LL. 22-23.
1

6This dialogue continued with B.Kunz replying to B.Nield's Memo. B.Kunz sent B.Nield
a letter dated April 5, 2013 further explaining his position regarding the 80/20 percentage split
vis a vis the 50/50 percentage split dispute.
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to escalate. B.Kunz received a check from N.I. in the sum of $424.00. See Tr. Ex. 111, p.
The description of the check reflects that this check is for profit sharing, but does not identify
for which insurance company.
B.Kunz sent B.Nield an e-mail on April 17, 2013
concerning this check thanking
the profit sharing check, asking that the insurance
company be identified, and inquiring concerning what the split percentage was. B.Kunz also
asked that he be provided with the profit sharing agreements in place with all of the
insurance companies. B.Kunz testified that B.Nield never responded to this e-mail and that
ultimately M.Kunz called B.Nield and obtained the information about the profit sharing
check in question. This was a profit sharing check from Acuity. Apparently the percentage
split and profit sharing agreements were not provided or disclosed as requested by B.Kunz. 18
26.

Tr. Ex. 113 reflects contingent commissions paid to N.1. by Farmers AJliance Insurance
Company for the years at issue in this litigation, 2008 through 2012. Tr., p. 58, LL. 23-25,
p. 59, LL. 1-2. B.Kunz testified that during this time frame he only received on (1) profit
sharing or contingent commission check associated with Farmers Alliance Insurance and that
was in 2012 for 2011. See Tr. Ex. 107 and Finding of Fact No. 22. Tr. Ex. 114 reflects
contingent commission paid to N.I. by Acuity for the years at issue in this litigation, 2008
through 2012. Tr. p. 59, LL. 16-21. B.Kunz testified that during this time frame he only
received two (2) profit sharing or contingent commission checks, one for 2010 (See Tr. Ex.
106 and Finding of Fact No. 21) and another for 2012 (See Tr. Ex. 111 and Finding of Fact
No. 24). Finally, B.Kunz also contends that he is entitled to contingent commission or profit
sharing from Allied Insurance during the operative years, 2008 through 2012. Tr. p. 52, LL.
2-25, p. 53, L. I.
B.Kunz testified that the formula by which he feels his share of contingent commissions or
profit sharing should be calculated under the "Agent Contract" with N.I. is as follows:

I would take the total written premium. So for example, let's say the
total written premium with Acuity was $200,000. If I wrote [sic]
$100,000 of that then I would - and Jet's say the total contingent
payment was I 0,000 and my book of business would have been
responsible for that I would take 80 percent of that 5,000.
Tr. p. 60, LL. 4-12.

11
_ 8.Kunz

testified that the handwriting on page two (2) of this exhibit, is that of M.Kunz.
He testified that she wrote this information on the document upon obtaining the same from
B.Nield.
18

B.Kunz testified that since this litigation has been commenced and through the
discovery process he has obtained and reviewed information upon which he believes the 2012
profit sharing payment in the sum of $424.00 does not amount to either a 50% or 80% split. Tr.
p. 56, LL. 2-8.
•
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B.Kunz testified that at the time he signed and entered into the 2009 "Agent Contract" he
believed, and that his intent was, that he would receive an 80% split of whatever N.I. was
paid off of the insurance business that he sold, including contingent commission or profit
sharing. Tr. p. 95,
He testified further that in some years NJ. would not have
sharing
certain companies, Acuity, Farmers
qualified for contingent bonuses or
Alliance and Gem State Insurance, without his sales being combined with N.I.'s sales.
p. 95, LL. 11-23. This fact is supported by the testimony ofB.Nield. Tr. p. 200, LL. 11-23.
29.

B.Nield in his testimony asserted that NJ. does not pay profit sharing or contingent
commissions. Tr. p. 201, LL. 4-9. At trial, B.Nield chose to characterize the payments NJ.
made to B.Kunz and reflected in Tr. Ex.' s 106, 107, 109, and 111 as "profit sharing" as a
"bonus". Tr. p. 201, LL. 19-25.

30.

Effectively B.Nield admitted that NJ. paid B.Kunz 50% of the profit sharing received from
Gem State Insurance Company and NJ. was retaining 50% of the profit sharing from Gem
State Insurance Company. Tr. p. 201, LL. 24-25, p. 202, LL. 1-7.

31.

This separate or "individual agreement" is not to be found and is not contained in the parties'
"Agent Contract".

32.

B.Nield goes on to explain his rationale for this arrangement or "individual agreement" in
the following terms:
Gem State is a separate issue by itself. They pay him his - the whole
book ofbusiness is totally separate from ours. Therefore anything that
he would receive as profit sharing is paid directly to Bret from Gem
State. I believe Allstate is the same way, but I don't think we've seen
Allstate I've never seen an Allstate profit sharing check.
So based on Gem State paying him, since we own 50 percent of his
book of business, therefore, we receive 50 percent of the profit
sharing. Tr. p. 215, LL. 23-25, p. 216, LL. 1-8. 19

33.

B.Nield described in his testimony the manner in which N.I. pays out "bonuses" with respect
to other insurance carriers such as Acuity, Alliance, and Allied. He described this process in
the following terms:

19This

particular finding of fact is supported by what Bryan Nield said but to the extent
that this witness purports that Bret is paid directly by Gem State, that is inco;ect. The profit
sharing check is sent to Bret Kunz, but made payable to Nield, Inc. and is simply forwarded. Tr.
Vol. I, p. 51, LL. 21-25, p. 52, LL. 1- 10; p. 59, LL. 7-9. Note, this footnote was not part of the

Court's original findings and is added thereto.
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As I explained before, what we do is get together and take any profits
that
earned. And if we decide to give out bonuses then we
decide what - we take and pay money to the company, see what is
left, and determine what amount to
a bonus to whoever we
feel it is necessary.
Tr. p. 202, LL. 10-15. B.Nield clarifies this testimony by stating that N.I. would not
pay a bonus to a sub-agent unless N.I. had first received a profit sharing from the
insurance company. Tr. p. 204, LL. 10-11."
[record citations added in italics to original]
- End Court's Findings ofFactAlthough the Court appears thorough in its Findings of Fact, it ignored significant facts in
the record. For example, Ben Nield, co-owner of Nield, Inc., testified that Nield, Inc. did not have
in place any separate agreement with Bret for additional compensation. Tr. Vol. II, p. 367, LL. 9-11.
The crux of this case is not some hypothecated side agreement for profit sharing, but that
profit sharing is a part and parcel of the only contract between the parties, that of the "Agent
Contract" in question. Defendant's own expert witness, Stephen Ahl, testified:
THE COURT: I'm going to ask two questions just so you'll be able to cross on my
questions, Mr. Wuthrich.
Are you aware-you talked about contingent commission or profit sharing with
agencies who have a contract with Allied, correct?
THE WITNESS: Correct.
THE COURT: And that the contingent commission or profit sharing are paid to the
agencies, correct?
THE WITNESS: Correct.
THE COURT: If there is a subagent or a producer that works for the agent, are you
aware of any of those agencies who share in the profit sharing or contingent
commission with those producers or agents?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: That does happen?
THE WITNESS: It does.
THE COURT: All right. That's all I have.
Tr. Vol. II, p. 358, LL. 24, 25, p. 359, LL. 1-15.
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In addition to the use of the word "commissions" Bret Kunz testified that the language of
""'"'""'" 6 of the Agent Agreement, "other functions based on commission split" would also entail

I,

100,

L

ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

DID THE COURT ERR IN CONSIDERING BRYAN NIELD'S UNDISCLOSED
SUBJECTIVE INTENT IN CONSTRUING THE SUBJECT CONTRACT?

II.

DID THE COURT MISCONSTRUE THE PARTIES' COURSE OF DEALING
UNDER THE AGENT CONTRACT IN CONCLUDING THERE WAS A SIDE
AGREEMENT AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROFIT SHARING PAYMENTS
TO BRET KUNZ, RATHER THAN UTILIZING THE PARTIES' COURSE OF
DEALING TO INTERPRET THE CONTRACT AMBIGUITY?

III.

DID THE COURT ERR IN IGNORING THE "OTHER FUNCTIONS" LANGUAGE
OF THE SUBJECT AGENT CONTRACT AS AN ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR
PROFIT SHARING PAYMENTS?

IV.

DIDTHECOURTERRINCONCLUDINGTHATPROFITSHARINGPAYMENTS
SHOULD BE PREDICATED ON OWNERSHIP PERCENTAGE RATHER THAN
THE COMMISSION SPLIT SET FORTH IN THE AGREEMENT?

V.

DID THE COURT ERR IN FAILING TO CONSTRUE THE AGENT CONTRACT
AGAINST THE DRAFTER, NIELD, INC.?

VI.

DID THE COURT ERR IN ITS JUDGMENT FORM BY NOT ACKNOWLEDGING
THE

APPELLANTS PREVAILED IN

PART IN

THE

JUDGMENT?
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DECLARATORY

Attorney's Fees on Appeal.
The Appellants claim entitlement to attorney's fees in the underlying action predicated on
not

personal, family or household

matters. Although bifurcated below, and certified under Rule 54 for purposes of appeal, Appellants
stand ready to prove their 10-day notice preceding the filing of this action at such time as the case
is concluded. AppeBants should be entitled to their attorney's fees on appeal, as well, under 12120(5).

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
A. Standards on Review.
As was stated in Pocatello Hospital, LLC., v. Quail Ridge Medical Center, 156 Idaho 709,
330 P.3d 1067 (2014):
When reviewing a trial court's decision following a bench trial, this Court's
review is limited to determining the following:
[W]hether the evidence supports the findings of fact, and
whether the findings of fact support the conclusions oflaw. A district
court's findings of fact in a bench trial is to be liberally construed on
appeal in favor of the judgment entered, in view of the district court's
role as the finder of fact. It is the province of the district judge acting
as trier of fact to weight the conflicting evidence and testimony and
judge the credibility of witnesses. We will not substitute our view of
the facts for the view of the district court. Instead where findings of
fact are based on substantial evidence, even if the evidence is
conflicting, those findings will not be overturned on appeal. We
exercise free review over the lower court's conclusions of law,
however, to determine whether the court correctly stated the
applicable law , and whether the legal conclusions are sustained by
the facts found. Pocatello Hospital, supra, at 156 Idaho 714, 330
P.3d. 1072; Clayson v Zebe, 153 Idaho 228,232,280 P.3d 731, 735
(2012)
As noted earlier, Appellants herein do not take umbrage with the facts found by the trial
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court, but does disagree with the statement
conclusions reached, specifically that

are

law as applied by the lower court and with the
to the facts as found.

B. Argument.

I.

THE COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING BRYAN NIELD'S UNDISCLOSED

SUBJECTIVE INTENT IN CONSTRUING THE SUBJECT CONTRACT.
The Court cited Beus v. Beus, 151 Idaho 235, 238, 254 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2011) in its
Conclusion of Law ,I 16, for the proposition that, "The determination of the parties' intent with
respect to a contract provision 'is to be determined by looking at the contract as a whole, the
language used in the document, the circumstances under which it was made, the objective and
purpose of the particular provision, and any construction placed upon it by the contracting parties
as shown by their conduct or dealings."' R. 515-16. However, the Court overlooked the remainder
of that principle cited in Beus that "[A] party's subjective, undisclosed intent is immaterial to the
interpretation of a contract." Beus, supra at 1234, citing toJ.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611,
167 P.3d 748 (2006). Pocatello Hospital, supra, at 156 Idaho 720, 330 P.3d. 1078. [Emphasis

added.]
In the present case, the District Court virtually conceded that Nield, Inc. and/or its agents
never disclosed that the payments they labeled as "profit sharing" when they sent them to Bret Kunz
were purportedly bonuses, and in fact the District Court did not even believe Bryan Nield's
testimony in that regard. Specifically, Judge Brown stated in footnote 24 of the Conclusions of Law:
The Court recognizes that these claims by B.Kunz concerning statements made by
B.Nield are disputed and that B.Nield denies making said statements. However, the
Court has determined that B.Kunz' testimony is more credible and reliable on these
points and accepts his testimony as being accurate and truthful on these points. There
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are a number of reasons for the Court's determination on this point, chief among
them being that long before the litigation was filed or even contemplated by these
parties, B.Nield and N.I. freely used the term profit sharing in dealing with B.Kunz
with respect to Gem State Insurance,
and Farmers Alliance. Not only was this
term used on check receipts (B.Nield testified that the phrase profit sharing was used
on some documents generated byN.L, because of its accounting software). See Tr.
Ex. 111, p. 2, it was also freely used in B.Nield's Memo's to B.Kunz. See Tr. Ex. 's
106, 107, and 109. Never once. prior to this litigation. did B.Nield dispute, correct
or suggest to B.Kunz that profit sharing was not part of their relationship and that
B.Kunz was off base in his understanding that there was profit sharing. It is
inconceivable to this Court, that a business. such as N.I., and/or a principal in said
business. such as B.Nield, would allow a partner or colleague such as B.Kunz to
continue uncorrected when it was so clear that he believed that he was entitled to
profit sharing. The dialogue was never about whether profit sharing existed, but the
amount of the split. See Tr. Ex.'s 108, 109, and 110. [emphasis added]
Nevertheless, the District Court concluded that there was a separate agreement, apart from
the non-integrated Agent Contract, with respect to profit sharing or contingent bonuses to Bret Kunz
with respect to Gem State insurance (Conclusion of Law ,r 28, R. 519-20), but denied there was any
legally enforceable agreement for Bret Kunz to receive profit sharing, contingent commissions or
bonuses from Nield, Inc. with respect to Acuity, Alliance or Allied, and specifically concluded

those payments appeared to have been paid out as a gratuitous bonus. (Conclusion, first
paragraph 5, R. 526.) By so ruling, the Court accepted the "subjective, undisclosed intent" of Bryan
Nield in interpreting the contract, contrary and wholly inconsistent with the guidelines set for in
Beus, supra, because there is no other basis in the record for supporting this conclusion other than

Bryan Nield's subjective and undisclosed statement of intent in paying what he specifically labeled
as "profit sharing" payments to Bret Kunz.
The objective facts are that Bret Kunz received profit sharing for 201 O for both Gem State
and Acuity, labeled as profit sharing by Bryan Nield, Ex. 106.
Bret Kunz received profit sharing from Bryan Nield for 2011 for both Gem State and
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - Page 18

Again, this was labeled as

Alliance. Ex.

sharing. Bret Kunz received profit sharing for

and argued in writing with Bryan Nield about the proper

State for
sharing should

that

split

ownership, not commissions, and therefore must be split 50i50. Nevertheless, Bryan Nield conceded
and split the profit sharing 80/20 in favor of Bret Kunz. Ex. 109.
Bret Kunz also received a profit sharing check from Acuity for 2012, (again labeled by Nield.
Inc., as profit sharing) but the Kunz office had to call to verify for which insurance company the
profit sharing check was attributable. Ex. 111. 20
The District Court was in clear error by considering, to any degree, the subjective,
undisclosed intent of Bryan Nield about said payments which, only in litigation, did he term as
"bonuses". Nowhere in the record is there even a scintilla of evidence that Nield, Inc., or its agents
ever disclosed to Bret Kunz that they intended any of the foregoing payments as a "bonus". 21 This
case is even more egregious than the cited authorities. Beus, supra, the case referenced by the
District Court below, cited the principle that an undisclosed, subject intent was immaterial, was
predicated on J.R. Simplot, supra, at 151, which stated:
A parties' subjective, undisclosed intent is immaterial to the interpretation of a
contract. As explained in 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 347 (2004):
A party's subjective, undisclosed intent is immaterial to the
interpretation of a contract, as under the objective law of contract

Bret Kunz never received any profit sharing checks related to Alliance, but maintains in
this action a right to same should the case proceed to the damages portion of the bifurcated
proceedings.
20

21 0rdinarily

this counsel would be making the arguments that the trial court's findings
were not supported by the evidence, but ironically the District Court below found in favor of the
Kunzs, but concluded contrary to its own findings of fact.
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interpretation, the court will give force and effect to the words of the
contract without regard to what the parties to the contract thought it
meant or what they actually intended for it to mean. The court will
not attempt to ascertain the actual material processes of the parties in
entering into the particular contract; rather the law presumes that the
parties understood the import of their contract and that they had the
intention which its terms manifest.
In this case, Bosen does not contend he ever verbalized to any of Simplot's
agents his intent not to be personally obligated ,;mder the contract. His subjective
intent or beiief does not create a genuine issue of material fact.
In the instant action, not only did Bryan Nield, or any Nield, Inc. agent, not express their
intent that payments to Bret Kunz were gratuitous bonuses, they expressed precisely the opposite,
that the payments were Bret Kunz' profit sharing [split] and disguised the payments in uneven
amounts so that Kunz couldn't possibly have even guessed that they were some arbitrary bonus. The
Court realized this fact, found Kunz' testimony to be credible and Bryan Nield's testimony not
credible, but nevertheless considered immaterial evidence in construing the subject contract.
Nowhere in the record, prior to this litigation, is there any evidence whatsoever that the payments
labeled as "profit sharing" by Nield, Inc. were bonuses, and the Court erred in even considering such
a deceitful lie. 22

This counsel cannot resist the urge to take a soapbox and argue the public policy against
encouraging false testimony in court. We have reached a point in our society where politicians,
lawyers and trusted officials are allowed to put a "spin" on everything. However, the courtroom
should preserve a modicum of honesty and truthfulness, less the judicial system degenerate into
anarchy. People should not be allowed to take the sacred oath, and explain away their conduct
with what is obviously, patently untruthful testimony. Have we, as a society, deteriorated to the
point where, in the name of politeness, we no longer call a liar a liar? If we have, it's a sad
commentary. Moreover, in this case, to have the judge recognize the falsity of Bryan Nield 's
statements and conduct, but reward him with judgment nevertheless predicated thereon, is a
travesty, not just for Bret Kunz, but for the judicial system. Doesn't this encourage everybody to
lie in the courtroom? What benefit is served by that?
22
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II.

THE COURT MISCONSTRUED THE PARTIES' COURSE OF DEALING UNDER
THE AGENT CONTRACT IN CONCLUDING THERE WAS A SIDE AGREEMENT
AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROFIT SHARING PAYMENTS TO BRET

KUNZ, RATHER THAN UTILIZING THE PARTIES' COURSE OF DEALING TO
INTERPRET THE CONTRACT AMBIGUITY.
The Court appeared to be seeking a hypothetical "side agreement" to explain the parties'
course of dealings, rather than recognize that said conduct reflects the parties own interpretation of
the word "commission".
A review of the actual contract document language is appropriate. The signed contract provides:
4) Relationship: The association existing between Company and Agent. This
association is not an Employer/Employer relationship. The agent is a sub-contractor
and the company provides markets through which an agent can place insurance
business.
5) Responsibilities of Agent: The agent is a sub-contractor and as such has
responsibility for all expenses related to his or her business. This includes, but is not
limited to, federal, state, FICA, unemployment, and local taxes. The Company will
provide to the Agent a 1099 Form showing annual earnings. The agent is responsible
for Workers Compensation Insurance on self and employees. Agent is to place all
insurance business through company. 23 Company has final underwriting authority for
all business placed. Agent has responsibility for own health, life and other personal
insurances. Agent may not place insurance business through another company. Agent
is responsible for all premium and return commissions on business placed. When
collections are not on time, deduction may be made from payment of commissions
due. When the collection is completed the deducted commission will be paid.

1n the Michael Kunz contract the contract provides, "Agent is to place insurance
bus1~ess through company except health and life policies that are individual company
appo1~tments. Agent is responsible to be familiar with and follow underwriting, binding
authonty and other guidelines of insurance carriers represented by the Company." This language
also appears in Bret Kunz original contract, Exhibit 102, and the draft agreement, Exhibit 103,
but was changed unbeknownst to Bret and Marti Kunz in the final agreement, Tr. Vol. I, p. 34,
LL. 1-8, Ex. 103; p. 35, LL. 2-21, Ex. 105.
.

23
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6) Responsibilities of Company: Company will maintain contracts with companies
for placing of insurances. Company will do all billing and accounting functions
(except collections). Agent is personally responsible for the collection of premiums
and returned commissions on business placed. The company will provide to the agent
a 1099 Form showing annual earnings. Company will provide agent with a
commission earned statement and commission check based on the agreed percentages
on the 15 1h of each month. 24 Other functions based on commission split and
individual agreement..
7) Terms of Compensation: Agent will receive 80 percent of commissions received
on insurance placed by agent with companv. Comoany will receive 20 percent of
commissions placed by agent with company.
8) Ownership: This is subject to change, but only as agreed between Company and
Agent. The agent will own 50% of the book of business and the company will own
50% of the book of business. If agent decides to sell his percent of ownership, the
company has first right of refusal at a price determined at the time of sale. Ifcompany
refuses to purchase, the agent may sell his percentage of ownership to a licensed and
qualified agent for the State of Idaho and must be approved by the company. A
covenant not to compete will be included in the contract of sale.
8) Errors and Omissions: Agent will keep in force Errors and Omissions insurance
on agent and employees. This coverage will 25 be purchased as a part of the Errors and
Omissions policy maintained by company. The agent is responsible for all premiums
and deductibles assessed by the policy. It is understood that the Errors and Omissions
policy maintained by the company is only for insurance placed through the company.
Exhibit 104, Marti Kunz, and 105, Bret Kunz.

Although the District Court below seemed to view all the contracts as synonymous, distinct
differences were in fact made between the draft version and the final contract and the final contract
signed by Bret and Marti is not a mirror image of the Michael Kunz contract. It was obviously Bryan

24

The actual language of the foregoing two sentences is not readable on the contact (Ex.
104 or 105) because it appears overprinted with Nield, Inc., letterhead, but is deciphered from
the draft version, (Ex. 103)
25

The contracts as signed contain the word "will", whereas all of the previous contracts
and the draft contain the word "may". See and compare Ex. 101, 102 and 103 with 104 and 105.
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Nield's intent to bind Bret and Marti to different terms, (specifically to get his hands on the life and
commissions) than Nield, Inc., had Michael Kunz.
Court acknowledged that

gre:em,em is ambiguous

its use of the word

"commissions", but ultimately construed the contract in the narrowest light in favor of Nield, Inc.
This construction flies in the face of the both the expressed intent contemporaneous with the signing
of the instrument, and the parties' course of dealing with each other subsequent thereto.
The Court stated in Conclusion No. 26 (R.519) that there was a statement about how good
profit sharing checks Nield Inc., had with Michael Kunz made by Bryan Nield at the time of the
signing of the subject contracts with Bret and Marti Kunz. The Court went on to elucidate in
footnote 24 of the Conclusions that the Court believed Bret's testimony over Bryan Nield's denial
of any such statements. Although designated as a "Conclusion" that portion of,J 26 is obviously a
factual determination of credibility of witnesses and must be accepted as true by this Court.
Prior to that time [the signing of the subject contracts in the fall of 2008] Bret had not
received any profit sharing or bonus checks under his 1996 contract. Tr. Vol. I, p. 138, LL. 4-19; See
also p. 27, LL. 14-19. Therefore, there was no right to receive profit sharing under the 1996 contract,

the Court reasons, but suddenly, on the day Bret and Marti Kunz sign the contract, Bryan Nield is
talking about profit sharing payments. If Bret has no right to profit sharing by virtue of the agreement
just that very moment entered into by Bret and Nield, Inc., what's the point of Bryan Nield
mentioning it? The only thing that has changed, is that Bret has just signed a contract under which

Nield, Inc. filed both counterclaim against Bret Kunz and a cross-claim against Marti
Kunz fo.r those premiums (life and health). It was not until three weeks before trial that Nield,
Inc. capitulated and agreed that it had no interest in the Kunz' life and health business. This
further demonstrates the sharp practice by which Nield, Inc. dealt with Plaintiffs.
26
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is a 50/50 owner

the book of business

entitle him to profit
alleged "side agreement" come

the Montpelier office. If that ownership interest
under the Agent's contract, when exactly did this

it suddenly

from the sky between the time

Bret lifted his pen off the signature line of the Agent Contract and when Bryan Nield started talking
about profit sharing payments in that same meeting, sort of an "immaculate [contact] conception"
as it were?
How did this alleged "side agreement" come into being? The Court states that:
28. As a result of the foregoing, this Court concludes that Bret K has Kunz
established a course of dealing with B. Nield, a representative and principal ofNield,
Inc., sufficient to establish an agreement, separate and apart from their non-integrated
"Agent Contract" (an "individual agreement" as discussed in paragraph 6) for the
payment of profit sharing or contingent commission bonuses to B. Kunz with respect
to Gem State Insurance. R. 519-520.
The "foregoing" to which the Court refers must necessarily be conclusions 25, 26, and
27,(R.518-519) which acknowledge profit sharing payments received by Bret Kunz from Acuity and
Alliance as well. If the profit sharing payments are not part of the Agent Contract signed in 2008,
what was the point of the profit sharing references made by Bryan Nield at the time of signing the
Agent Contract and found to have been said by the Court? Was this some prophetic comment that
Bryan Nield knew, somehow, in the distant future the parties would establish an implied contract
based upon a course of dealing that had not yet even begun to happen?
Clearly the Court has ignored its own factual findings about what was said contemporaneous

Bret received his first profit sharing check in 2009, for the 2008 year. Tr. Vol. I, p.53,
LL. 2-9; Ex, 115. A fortiori, under the trial court's reasoning, this "side agreement" must have
already been created based upon???? The parties had years of prior dealings under the 1996
contract with Bret receiving no profit sharing, and the record is wholly devoid of any testimony
about any profit sharing "course of dealing" in 2008.
27
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the signing in favor ofthe [legally immaterial], undisclosed and subjective intent of Bryan Nield
that profit sharing payments made by Nield,

are just gratuitous bonuses. The District Court has
making this conclusion, and this Court is free

to correct that error as a matter of law.
Statements made contemporaneous with the signing of a non integrated contract are material
to its interpretation. Where a document is ambiguous then evidence as to the meaning of the
instrument maybe submitted tothetrieroffact. Brown v. Greenheart, 157 Idaho 156, 166, 335 p.3d
1, 11 (2014);KnipeLand Co., v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449,455,259 P.3d 595,601 (2011); See also,

Johnson Cattle Company v. Idaho First National Bank, 110 Idaho 604, 607 716 P.2d 1376, 1379
(1986)(oral agreement reached during telephone conversation would be admissible to determine
meaning and full import of the Subordination Agreement).
In this case, the trier of fact simply ignored the fact that the parties themselves were

recognizing that the term "commission", as utilized in paragraph 7 of the Agent Contract, included
profit sharing or contingent commissions when the District Court made its conclusions. Not only
would the contemporaneous statements made by Bryan Nield be an absurdity if were not so, but his
entire course of dealing recognized and specified the right of Bret Kunz to receive profit sharing
payments. Bryan Nield only disputed the predicate split upon which those payments should be paid. 28
"The conduct of the parties to a contract and their practical interpretation of
it is an important factor when there is a dispute over its meaning." Mountainview
Landowners Coop. Ass'n, Inc. v. Cool, 142 Idaho 861, 865, 136 P.3d 332, 336
(2006). Because the parties used this percentage in prior dealings, it is reasonable,
and equitable, to likewise use it as the factor for the equitable adjustment. Moreover,

Well at least up to the point Bryan Nield got caught with his hand in the cookie jar, and
then when this litigation ensued, his position changed to the alleged "gratuitous bonus" theory, a
matter wholly immaterial to the contract interpretation issue as argued in Issue I herein.
28
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the proper time for haggling over the adjustment metric was during co~tr~c
t
formation. As a sophisticated party, the City took a risk, ex ante, by not specify
ing
how the adjustment would be calculated. It could have drafted its own preferr
ed
metric, but for whatever reason it did not. It thus cannot credibly argue now, ex
post,
that the adjustment chosen by the district court is unsuitable. In any event, the district
court's percentage-based adjustment conforms with the parties' prior conduct
and,
thus, is proper. We therefore affirm. [Emphasis added.]
City of Meridian v. Petra, Inc., supra at 299 P.3d 246. In this case, the parties
did agree as to the

percentage commissions were to be split, i.e. 80/20. The course of dealing demon
strates that the
parties themselves recognized that the term "commissions" included conting
ent commissions or
profit sharing payments. Although they disputed the percentage split through
out thei: course of
dealing, there was never a dispute about entitlement to profit sharing express
ed in any of the
communications between the parties from 2009 until this litigation commenced
in 2013.
The Court concluded that because the payments were neither 50/50 nor 80/20
to Acuity and Alliance, that there must not be an implied in fact contract for conting

with respect

ent commissions

with respect to those companies, distinguishing Gem State. The only real distinc
tion between Gem
State and the other two companies upon which Nield, Inc. expressly paid profit
sharing payments
is that because the check came to Bret Kunz directly from Gem State (albeit payabl

e to Nield, Inc.),

Bret Kunz would have knowledge of the aggregate amount of the profit sharing
payment,
with the other two companies all of the accounting information was exclusively
of Nield, Inc.

whereas

within the domain

Tr. Vol. I, p. 51, LL. 21-25, p. 52, LL. 1- 10; p. 59, LL. 7-9. The reason that
the

Acuity payments and the Alliance payments are not congruent with either 80/20

or 50/50 is because

Nield, Inc. was deceiving Bret Kunz, knowing he wouldn 't have access to inform
ation by

which he

could discover the deception. There can only be one logical and rational explan
ation for making the
payments in such arbitrary and uneven amounts. The Court recognized this
in footnote 28 of its
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Conclusions of Law. There is no reasonable rationale for distinguishing the profit sharing payments

All three companies are property and casualty companies,

I,

94, LL. I

Vol. II,

p. 285, LL. 5-9. All three companies are a part of the 50% book of business owned by Nield, Inc. and
Bret Kunz, Tr. Vol. I, p. 216, LL. 9-12. See also, Tr. Vol. II, p. 285, LL. 10-12. All three companies
require specific goals be met in order to qualify for contingent commissions or profit sharing
payments, Tr. Vol. I, p. 175, LL. 18-20, and are not guaranteed, Tr. Vol. I, p. 94, LL. 9-13. However,
none of the commissions that Bret is paid (even on a monthly basis) are guaranteed, being contingent
upon underwriting accepting a policy, contingent on the insured paying the premium, or the insured
not cancelling the policy and going with another company, Tr. Vol. I, p. 94, LL. 14-25, p. 95, LL.
1-2. All three companies pay contingent commissions or profit sharing payments annually and not
monthly, Tr. Vol. II, p. 272, LL. 2-4. All three companies issue the checks payable to Nield, Inc. and
not to Bret Kunz, Tr. Vol. I, p. 216, LL. 19-25. From this, somehow, the Court concluded that Kunz
is entitled to 50 percent of the Gem State profit sharing and not one dime of the other companies. 29

It is simply intellectually dishonest and flies in the face of the factual findings of the Court itself and
of the parties' course of dealing and performance with each other.
True, Nield, Inc. was cheating Bret Kunz on contingent commission or profit sharing
payments where Bret did not have access to the accounting information, and attempting to delude
Bryan Nield testified that N.I. doesn't pay any profit sharing or contingent commissions,
Tr. Vol. I, p. 20 I, LL. 7-9, but that they "get together and take any profits we've earned. And if
we decide to give out bonuses then we decide what - we take and pay money to the company, see
what is left, and determine what amount to pay for a bonus to whoever we feel is necessary." Tr.
Vol. I, p. 202, LL. 10-15. Under that formula, Bryan Nield denied that the unusual number of
$663.50 was designed to make Bret think he got his fair share of a profit sharing check from
Acuity. Tr. Vol. I, p. 202, LL. 16-21.
29
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him into believing he had received 50 percent

his pro rata share

, · payment .30
the comm1ss1on

construing a contract in favor of the drafter. If anything, as
a matter

public policy and jurisprudence, it

discouraged, not encouraged in people's

contractual relations. The net result in this case is to reward the deceiver. Moreover, inasmuch as the
deception was never disclosed to Bret Kunz prior to this litigation, it cannot stand as a basis of the
parties' intent. Bues, supra.
The District Court erred in not recognizing the parties' course of dealing defined the parties'
intent with respect to the term "commissions", in the Agent Contract, rather than some implied in
fact agreement. The Court was troubled by the lack of evidence that Michael Kunz was paid profit
sharing payments; however, while Bryan Nield initially denied paying any profit sharing payments
to Michael Kunz, he later acknowledged Michael was paid from Gem State. Tr. Vol. II, p. 284, LL.
20-25, p. 285, LL. 1-4. He further acknowledged that he didn't know how Michael was paid
concerning the "other functions" portion of the contract. Tr. Vol. II, p.283, LL. 24-25, p. 284, LL.
1-19. Bryan acknowledged that information would be within the purview of his father. Id. The
subject contract, however, was drafted solely by Bryan Nield and entered into by Bryan, Marti and
Bret. The Court placed undue emphasis on the absence of proof of what transpired between the
deceased Michael Kunz and Nield, Inc., attributing this to a lack of due diligence on Bret Kunz' part.
R. 525, footnote 29. The Appellants are unsure what speculation the Court places here. Michael

Kunz was obviously an unavailable witness, and the records of profit sharing payments to him were

30Bret

Kunz testified that when he received the Acuity profit sharing check of $663.50 he
believed he was receiving his fair share of the profit sharing payment for that year. Tr. Vol. I, p.
48, LL. 4-23. In reality, after subpoenaing the records in this case from the insurance company,
that number did not correlate to either 50/50 or 80/20, and "there's no mathematical sense to that
based on anything in the contract." Tr. Vol. I, p. 48, LL. 7-10.
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exclusively within the domain of the adverse party, whom we've already established was less than
forthright with Bret Kunz. The question before the Court is the intent of these parties, and the words
used by Bryan Nield

labeling payments to Bret Kunz as profit sharing for Gem State, as profit

sharing for Acuity, as profit sharing for Farmers Alliance, and in stating in his own written
memoranda to Bret that the payments were for profit sharing, speaks louder than the quietness of the
deceased Michaei Kunz as to these parties' intent.
Finally, the Court's ruling that Brett Kunz should be paid profit sharing on Gem State as a
side agreement, flies in the face of the parties 's discussions during said course of dealing, particularly
Ex. 109 wherein Bryan Nield wrote "The reason we have paid profit sharing 50/50 is based on
ownership, not commissions, and therefore there are no guarantees on profit sharing." Ex. 109. The
only basis for Bret having any ownership interest at all [in the book of business] is the 2009 contract,
as he had no ownership interest under the 1996 contract (and the purchase of the Michael Kunz's
book of business from Judy Kunz, Ex. 128). Profit sharing is, at a minimum, a derivative of his
Agent Agreement, and not some side agreement. 31 Bret owns no more, and not less, of the book of
business with Gem State as he does with Acuity and Alliance-exactly 50% of the Montpelier book.
This Court should reverse the District Court on the issue of the meaning of "commissions" as
between Bret and Marti Kunz and Nield, Inc. under the 2009 contract. 32

As previously noted in footnote 26, Bret received the first profit sharing check in 2009,
Just after execution of the subject Agent Contract.
.

31

32 Again,

it was Bret Kunz' understanding that under his 1996 contract, in which he was
not owner of the book of business, profit sharing payments were being paid to Michael. He
simply wasn't expecting, as a sub-producer under Michael, to receive them personally. Tr. Vol I,
p. 27, LL. 10-22, p. 28, LL 1-22.
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III.

THE COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE "OTHER FUNCTIONS" LANGUAGE
OF THE SUBJECT AGENT CONTRACT AS AN ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR
PROFIT SHARING PAYMENTS.
Although not Bret Kunz' primary position, he maintained alternatively below that the

language "other function based on commission split" of section 6 of the Agent Contract would also
cover his claim for profit sharing or contingent commissions. Tr. Vol. I, p. 100, LL. 6-11. The
District Court concluded that the "other functions" language was ambiguous, R. 517, 1 19, but never
addressed what that language does mean. In fact, in light of the Court's conclusions in this case, that
language becomes meaningless surplusage.
In construing a contract an interpretation should be avoided that would render meaningless
any particular provision in the contract. Star Phoenix Mining Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 130 Idaho
223,233,939 P.2d 542,552 (1997) (citing to Top of the Track Assoc. v. Lewiston Raceways, Inc.,
654A.2d 1293, 1296(Me. 1995); WyomingGame&Fish Comm 'n v. Mills Co., 701 P.2d 819 (Wyo.

1985). If the "other functions" language does not embrace profit sharing and contingent
commissions, what on earth does it embrace? The language uses the words "based on commission
split", therefore, the "other functions" must have something to do with commissions that could be
split. If you rule that the language of ,r 7 of the Agent Agreement must be construed narrowly when
referencing commissions, which Appellant doesn't agree with, you must necessarily, as a matter of
contract construction, rule that the "other functions" language embraces

all other types of

commissions. Anything less is to simply scratch out that language from the contract and create a
better agreement for Nield, Inc. than that which it drafted for itself. By use of the words "based on
commission split" the other functions must relate to some type of commission. These parties have
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"initial commissions" and "residual commissions" which the Court recognizes as covered by the
"commission" language

1 7.

commissions, commonly referred to as profit

of1

not cover contingent

If the
light

Court's narrow construction

the "other functions" language is rendered meaningless.

In Steal Farms, Inc. v. Croft & Reed, Inc., 154 Idaho 259,297 P.3d 222 (2012), the Idaho
Supreme Court stated:
We hold the Lease and Option is ambiguous and the district court therefore
erred by excluding parol evidence of intent. The plain language of a contract, if
unambiguous, is controlling. Cont 'l Nat 'l Am. Group v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 95
Idaho 251, 253, 506 P.2d 478,480 (1973). A court must look to the contract as a
whole and give effect to every part thereof. Wright v. Village of Wilder, 63 Idaho 122,
125, 117 P.2d 1002, 1003 (1941). "For a contract term to be ambiguous, there must
be at least two difference reasonable interpretations of the term, or it must be
nonsensical." Swanson v. Beco Const.
145 Idaho 59, 62, 175 P.3d 748, 751
(2007)(citingArmstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. ofIdaho, 143 Idaho 135, 138, 139 P.3d
737, 740 (2006) and Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. ofIdaho, 138 Idaho 443, 446-47, 65
P.3d 184, 187-88 (2003)). "Parol evidence may be considered to aid a trial court in
determining the intent of the drafter of a document if any ambiguity exists." In re
Estate of Kirk, 127 Idaho 817, 824, 907 P.2d 794, 801 (1995) (citing Hall v. Hall,
116 Idaho 483,484, 777 P.2d 255, 256 (1989)).
According to the plain language of the Lease and Option, Steel Farms' lease
term began April 22, 2004 and ended March 1, 2008. In order to exercise Option A,
Steel Farms was required to "give written notice thereof to [Croft & Reed]
subsequent to the maturity of this option on July 15, 2008 and during the Term of this
lease (including any agreed extension or exercised option term but excluding any
holdover term)." We note first that the district court's interpretation fails to give
effect to every part of this provision. because it renders superfluous the words
"during the term of this lease (including... )". Contrary to the district court's
conclusion, the agreement's plain language suggest the parties did not intend to limit
exercise of Option A to the period of an agreed lease extension, but rather to grant
Steel Farms the ability to exercise the option during the initial lease term. [Emphasis
added.]

The Court in this case specifically found that the "other functions" sentence in 11 6 of the
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Agent Contract is ambiguous. R. 514, ,i 12, fn 21. Nevertheless, at the end of the day, based on the
construction, this language has been rendered meaningless. This language is especially
to this contract interpretation case because,

own terms, it is linked to the commission

split-the very heart of the subject dispute. The trial Court failed to provide any explanation as to why
the "other functions" language would not encompass contingent commissions in favor of an implied
in fact side agreement. Appellants maintain this is legal error. Where the parties have made a
provision that on its face seems to apply, and is consistent with their course of conduct, why would
one ever go outside of the parties own agreement to find an implied agreement whose terms are
nebulous and speculative at best, and in this case purely hypothetical. Of course, the reason is
because if the Court recognizes the parties' own words being consistent with their course of dealing,
then Nield, Inc. is obviously bound by the "based on commission split" language therein. It appears
to this counsel that rather than let the facts lead the conclusions, the trial Court made conclusions
which do not flow from either the facts found or the contract language.
By reading the Agent Agreement, iJ 6, consistent with, or supplemental to, ,r 7, we arrive at
a construction which gives meaning to ,r 6 and protects both parties. Where possible a construction
will be placed upon ambiguous or apparently inconsistent provisions of a contract as will give
protection to both parties, as against a construction which would only be in the interest of one of the
parties to the contract. Madrid v. Roth, 134 Idaho 802, 806, 10 P.3d 751, 755 (Idaho App. 2000);

Allen v. Ruby Co., 87 Idaho l, 11,389 P.2d 581k, 587 (1964).
For the forgoing reasons, this Court should conclude that the "other functions" language is
applicable and direct the trial Court to make enter judgment in favor of Bret Kunz under ,r 6 of the
Agent Contract on the declaratory judgment issue.
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IV.

THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PROFIT SHARING PAYMENTS
SHOULD BE PREDICATED ON OWNERSHIP PERCENTAGE RATHER THAN
THE COMMISSION SPLIT SET FORTH IN THE AGREEMENT.
As already noted, the Court's interpretation and conclusions of the contract are tainted by

consideration of the wholly subjective and undisclosed intent of Bryan Nield regarding profit sharing
payments being bonuses. Even if this Court were to uphold the supposed "side agreement", such that
Nield, Inc. is not constrained by its own contract, one cannot find that there was a meeting of the
minds regarding the commission split. It is clear from the evidence that Bret Kunz did not agree that
profit sharing should be split 50/50. The parties exchanged objections and memorandums arguing
the point, Ex. I 06, 108, 109, and 110. In fact, the last payment for Gem State paid by Nield, Inc. was
actually calculated under the 80/20 formula. Ex. I 09. In this case, the parties have addressed how
commissions are to be handled. Where contractual provisions conflict, "the interpretation of the
written contract and the intent of the parties is a matter for the trial judge's discretion." Haener v.

Ada Cnty. Highway Dist., 108 Idaho 170,173,697 P.2d 1184, 1187 (1985). Moreover, "[i]t is well
established that specific provisions in a contract control over general provisions where both relate
to the same thing." Twin Lakes Viii. Prop Ass 'n,lnc. v. Crowley, 124 Idaho 132, 138,857 P.2d 611,

617 ( 1993 ), cited in City ofMeridian v. Petra, supra at 246.
Here, we have a written contract which clearly defines the commission split. That provision
is not ambiguous and the Court did not find it was. Even if one were to find an ambiguity between
the commission split provision in

,r 7 and

the ownership of the first paragraph 8 of the Agent

Contract, one would still have to construe the contract in favor of the specific ,r 7 and against the
ownership provision in

,r 8, because nothing in ,r 8 specifically addresses commission split.
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The

Court in this case went completely outside of the written contract and construed and implied in fact
contract, but then imported 1 8's ownership provisions as the predicate for splitting the commission

An implied in fact contract might be found under circumstances where the parties have made
no contract for themselves but in fact have had a course of dealing that seems to recognize same.
Here, however, the parties had a written contract and the course of dealing was admitted to assist the
finder of fact in interpreting their intent under the words used, not to throw the contract in the
garbage and write a new contract for the parties better than what Nield, Inc. ever bargained for, and
entirely incongruous with the parties' course of dealings and the words expressed by Nield, Inc.
agents. This Supreme Court should set aside the conclusion that profit sharing payments are limited
to 50/50 where nothing in the written contract supports that and where the commission split is itself
unambiguous. Moreover, the "other functions" language of16 references the commission split, not
the ownership split. No one who signed the Agent Contract at issue in this case could possibly guess
at the signing thereof that any commission split between the parties would be other than 80/20. The
Trial Court erred in so concluding.

V.

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSTRUE THE AGENT CONTRACT
AGAINST THE DRAFTER, NIELD, INC.
Throughout the case the Plaintiff argued, and the Trial Court ignored the principle that

ambiguous terms are to be construed against the drafter. R. 437 (Plaintiff's Trial Brief), 436
(Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). Although not addressed by the
Court in its findings, the record is absolutely clear and undisputed that the subject contract entered
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by and between the parties was prepared and drafted by Bryan Nield, and he alone 33 • Tr. Vol.

1 Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

wherein Bryan Nield stated:
Okay. So did you prepare exhibit 105?
I'm sure I had a hand in it, yes.
Didn't you state in your deposition that you did prepare it?
That's what I just said.
You said here today that you just had a hand in it. Did you prepare it or not?
Yes.

The Court in this case acknowledged that the contract term "commissions" was ambiguous,
R. 516, 11 18, 19, ( and even recognized this fact at trial). 34 If it is necessary to examine extrinsic
evidence... [i]n making the examination one must be mindful that "a contract should be construed
most strongly against the party preparing it or employing the words concerning which doubt arises."

Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Grasmick, 91 Idaho 6, 9,415 P.2d 48, 51 (1966), cited by the dissent in
Simplotv. Bosen, supra at 757. See also, Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Luna, 241 P.3d 945, 149 Idaho
772 (2010) (ambiguous grant deed construed against the drafter, citing C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135
Idaho 763, 766, 25 P.3d 76, 79 (2001)); Madrid v. Roth, IO P.3d 751, 134 Idaho 802 (Idaho App.
2000); Schilling v. Allstate Ins. Co., 980 P.2d 1014, 132 Idaho 927 (1999); Suchan v. Suchan, 741
P.2d 1289, 113 Idaho 102 (1986) (the general rule that written documents, if ambiguous, should be
construed against the drafter, supra at 1295); Win ofMichigan, Inc. v Yreka United, Inc., 137 Idaho

33

The District Court never even addressed the issue of who drafted the contract, but the
record is undisputed on this point. Appellants maintain the lower court erred in not considering
this legal doctrine under the circumstances of this case.
34This

was also supported by Defendant's expert witness, Stephen Ahl, who
acknowledged that the term "commission" may or may not include profit sharing payments
within the insurance industry contract. Tr. Vol. II, p. 358, LL. 24, 25, p. 359, LL. 1-15.
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1, 53 P.3d 330, 334 (2002) (construe the contract most strongly against the person who
150 Idaho 308, 325,

prepared the contract).
961,

Other states concur. In Town ofMarana v. Pima County, 230 Ariz. 142, 281 P .3d 1010, 1015
(Ariz. App. Div. 1 2012) the Court noted that "[w]hen the meaning of a contractual provision
remains unclear after consideration of the parties' intentions, 'a secondary rule of construction
requires the provision be construed against the drafter."' citing to MT Builders, L.L. C., v Fisher

Roofing, Inc., 219 Ariz. 297, 302, ,r10, 197 P.3d 758, 763 (App. 2008);

35Board

of County

Commissioners of Butler County, v. Little, 305 P. 3d 49, (Kan. App. 2013)( an ambiguity in the
contract is construed against the drafter);, See also, Hayden Outdoors, LLC v. Zweygardt, 288 P.3d.
159 (Kan App. 2012); Botkin v. Security Bank, 281 Kan. 243, Syl.

~!7,

130 P.3d 92

(2006)("Ambiguous language in a written instrument will be strictly construed against the drafter
of the document"); Lamar Outdoor Advertising v. Harwood, 162 Wn. App. 385, 254 P.3d 208
(Wash. App. Div. 3 2011) (ambiguities are construed against the drafter of the contract);Rouse v.

Glascum Builders, Inc., 101 Wash. 2d 127, 135,677 P.2d 125 (1984).
Sound judicial policy favors the construction of ambiguities in a contract against the drafter.
If you construe ambiguous contracts in favor of the drafter, particularly in a situation where the
drafter puts out more than one contract, then you have an endless series of litigants in the court due
to the misunderstanding (or in this case intention misleading) of the other parties to those contracts.

35

Kunz recognizes the Court did not reach that far in its analysis, but maintains that is
because it [improperly] considered the immaterial evidence of Bryan Nield's undisclosed and
subjective intent regarding bonuses, and did not consider the parties course of dealing as
interpretive of the ambiguous term "commission", which it should have.
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For example, in this case, Nield, Inc. has more than one sub-producer, the others being in the
, ,,._,<U'-'l"' office.

If they,

are confused as

payments, each of them

their rights to contingent commissions or profit
as

because

were not parties to this suit

and did not get their day in court. If you construe against the drafter, you put an end to the litigation,
once and for all, because the drafter had his day in court and lost. It also encourages parties,
particuiariy commercial parties, to seek counsel in drafting sophisticated contract relationships to
avoid just the kind a malady that has occurred here.
By construing the contract narrowly in favor of the drafter, as in this case, the District Court
has encouraged both amateur contract drafting, and ambiguities designed to mislead or create
confusion, a policy which opens the floodgates for endless litigation and which serves no one's
needs (other than perhaps the legal community). Moreover, these parties are engaged in the insurance
business and necessarily know that the law construes ambiguous contracts against insurance
companies. It is reasonable they should expect the same treatment here.
The Court attempts to justify its deviation from the standard principle by arguing that Bret
Kunz did not get profit sharing payments when he was a sub-producer under Mike Kunz. However,
the Court ignored Bret Kunz' reasoning that "he [Michael Kunz] was giving me the full 80 percent
of the commission that was being paid on what I sold. He provided the office, the computers, took
care of all the office expenses, so he wasn't making a dime on me. Basically, it was agreed that he
took any profit sharing or contingent commissions." Tr. Vol. I, p. 27, LL. 14-19. Bret went on to
explain that, from his knowledge, Michael Kunz was receiving profit sharing. Tr. Vol. I, p. 27, LL.
20-23, p. 28, LL. 2-18. Even if Bret Kunz were not receiving profit sharing as a sub-producer under
Michael Kunz, that does not mean he didn't believe he was not entitled to profit sharing once he
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became a co-owner of the Montpelier book of business. In fact. the District Court's rationale in this
case for awarding Bret profit sharing payments at 50 percent for Gem State is predicated on his coownership of the Montpelier book of business, which flies in the face of the Court's own reasoning
that Gem state is a separate deal between the parties. 36The proper rule of construction, especially
where the Court admitted that, "The problem with both parties' positions is that the evidence, in the
trial record, demonstrates that there was much (sic] not much, if any', discussion regarding this
contract or its individual provisions."37 R. 517, ,i 22. The Court's position in its Conclusions of Law
are inherently incongruent and inconstant with its own findings. If there is little or no discussion
about profit sharing, the contract should be construed against the drafter because Bryan Nield drafted
an ambiguous contract. If there was discussion about profit sharing at the time of the signing of the
contract, then the contract should be construed in favor of profit sharing to Bret Kunz because that
was the parties' express intent at the time of signing. Either there was, or there was not, discussion
about profit sharing at the time of signing the contract. A fortiori, profit sharing or contingent
commissions are a part of the subject agency contract, and the Court erred in not so ruling.

VI.

THE COURT ERRED IN ITS JUDGMENT FORM BY NOT ACKNOWLEDGING
THE APPELLANTS PREVAILED IN PART IN THE DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT.

36

This also renders the language "other functions based upon commission split and
individual agreement" set forth in ,r 6 of the Agent Contract a nullity.
This conclusion [,r 22] flies in the face of conclusion ,i 26, R. 519, wherein the Court
found that there were discussions about profit sharing at the time of the signing of the contracts,
Ex. 104, 105, and the Court specifically noted that Nield, Inc. never disputed, corrected or
suggested that profit sharing was not a part of their relationship prior to this litigation. R. 519,
·
footnote 24.
37
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On November 20, 2014, just three week prior to trial, the Defendant, Nield, Inc., had a
hearing on its motion to amend its Complaint, at which it withdrew the Motion to Amend, stipulated
to dismiss its Counterclaim against Bret

prejudice, dismissed the cross-claim against

Marti Kunz with prejudice, and stipulated to the relief requested in Plaintiffs' third portion of the
declaratory judgment count of the Complaint. Tr. 11-20-14 hearing, p. 35, LL. 4-22; R. 323-325. 38
The Order to Dismiss the Counterclaim was entered November 20, 2014, R. 317-318, but no order
was ever entered with respect to dismissal of the cross-claim against Marti Kunz. Nor did the Court
in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 497-529, its Declaratory Judgment dated
September 18, 2015, R. 565-567, its Declaratory Judgment and Rule 54(b) Certificate dated
November 5, 2015, R. 687-690, or the Judgement and Rule 54(b) Certificate dated December 22,
2015, ever acknowledge that the Plaintiff prevailed on the third ground of its declaratory judgment
count.
The Court read into the record that portion of the third count, "the Defendant has no interest
in life and health insurance sold by Plaintiff or his wife, and no interest in the health insurance book
of business bought from Mike Kunz' s widow and enhanced or prospered thereafter by Marti Kunz."
Tr. 11-20-14 hearing, p. 16, LL. 16-20. Ultimately, Nield, Inc.'s stipulation to this fact has never
found its way into any judgment or declaratory judgment entered by the Court. This counsel
recognizes that the declaratory judgment appealed from is interlocutory in nature, and only certified
as final under Rule 54. Nevertheless, counsel would be amiss not to object on appeal to the form of

38

The actual Minute Entry & Order states that the Plaintiff agreed not to pursue the third
portion of the declaratory relief action, but the actual language of the hearing is different. Therein
counsel for the Kunz's specifically stated that he was not withdrawing it, [third count] but that
they [Nield, Inc.] were stipulating to it. Tr. 11-20-14 hearing, p. 35, LL. 11-22.
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the Order to protect his clients' interests. The fact that Plaintiffs prevailed in this regard (the life and
health business) is an important issue, may have an impact on attorney's fees below, and needs to
a part of the declaratory judgment itself, less

stipulation given

the Defendant be discarded

and of no import or effect. The Court should order that any final judgment incorporate into the
judgment language effectuating the stipulation of November 20, 2014.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the conclusions of the District Court regarding the declaratory
judgment action should be reversed, and the trial Court directed to enter judgment in favor of the
Appellants and against Nield, Inc. that the contract, specifically the use of the word "commission",
does include contingent commissions or profit sharing payments. Even if it did not, the "other
functions" language controls because any other interpretation would render this clause ofthe contract
meaningless. Bryan Nield' s subjective and undisclosed intent that what he labeled as "profit sharing"
was intended to be nothing more than gratuitous bonuses is wholly inadmissible and should not have
been considered by the trial Court in interpreting the contract. The contract was prepared by Nield,
Inc. entirely and should be construed against them. The judgment ultimately entered in this case
should further reflect the stipulation by Nield, Inc. that it has no right or interest in the Appellants'
life and health business. Finally, the Court should be directed to proceed with trial on the issue of
damages. Appellants should be awarded their attorney's fees on appeal.
DATED THIS

5'

day of July, 2016.

~~~~
EVEN A. W THRICH
Attorney for the Appellants
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